-validated the actions related to the Tampa and introduced new interdiction powers;--excised certain territories from the "migration zone" (the area in which valid applications for an Australian visa may be made) for the purposes of refugee law;19
-prevented "offshore entry persons" (unauthorized entrants to the excised areas) 2 from applying for protection visas in Australia,21 and permitted them to be taken offshore for the processing of their claims to refugee status;22 and -created a new temporary visa category for offshore entry persons,23 which effectively prohibits family reunion. The only opposition came from the smaller parties (the Democrats and Greens)24 and one independent in the Senate.
After the passage of the legislation, an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court on behalf of the asylum seekers rescued by the Tampa proved unsuccessful because the boat people were no longer detained within Australianjurisdiction and the case was therefore moot.25 In any event, the case would have been confined to a fairly limited scope in its consideration of human rights and refugee questions, revolving around the question of liberty. As significant as that question clearly is, the legislation that constitutes the legal basis for the Pacific Solution raises much larger questions concerning refugee protection. The Consequential Provisions Act also creates two new visa categories. Visa subclass 451 is for people intercepted on their way to Australia in transit countries like Indonesia.38 Visa subclass 447 is for "offshore entry persons."39 Both new visas are "offshore" visas, meaning that they are to be applied for from outside Australia.40 Three major preexisting offshore 29 See the definitions in Migration Act ?5, supra note 20. 30 Id. 31 There are two types of onshore protection visas. Visa subclass 866, the permanent protection visa, is available to refugees arriving in Australia on a visa (for example, a student visa), while visa subclass 785, the temporary protection visa, is now only available in principle to refugees arriving unlawfully (as a matter of Australian law) on the mainland. For the terms and conditions of these visas, see Migration Regulations, supra note 23, sched. 2, cls. 785,866.
II. THE NEW LEGISLATIVE SCHEME
32 Migration Act ?46A(2). 33 Id., ?189(3), (4). 34 Id., ?198A(1). 35 Id., ?198A(3) (a). 36 See, for example, the "Statement of Principles" signed by the president of Nauru and Australia's minister for defense on September 10, 2001 (copy on file with author). The "agreement" appears to be a memorandum of understanding, which Australia usually regards as nonbinding, and neither party seems to have registered it with the United Nations Secretary-General (not that either of these facts is determinative of the status of the agreement).
37 The Australian government has presented this refusal as a withdrawal of Australia's request: "Australia welcomed the serious consideration the government of Fiji gave to its request, and in view of Fiji's current situation, decided to withdraw the request. 48 The legislation may result in violations of one or more of these treaties. The legislation may permit refoulement to a place of persecution or torture; it discriminates between asylum seekers; it permits detention of asylum seekers in Australia, and the agreements with declared countries contemplate detention in those countries as well; and family reunion is prevented, in some cases indefinitely. Since it is well accepted that international law prohibits detention of asylum seekers while their refugee status is being determined, unless factors relevant to the individual (for example, a high risk of absconding) require detention,49 I will not dwell on that issue here. Rather, I will focus on interdiction, the development of the idea of "protection elsewhere," and the new visa regime.
Interdiction Revisited
The Australian legislation permits the interception of asylum seekers and denial of their access to Australian procedures for determining refugee status. Once an interception has been made, the Australian authorities have two options. One is to send the asylum seekers to countries participating in the Pacific Solution. New Zealand has participated to a limited extent and has accepted asylum seekers, generally those in family groups, for refugee status determination in the normal manner. Nauru and Papua New Guinea have also participated 41 The second, less obvious option for Australian authorities is to take boats of asylum seekers back to the high seas. This approach is permitted by the Border Protection Act, as there is no express linkage between the powers of interception contained in that Act50 and the powers to remove offshore entry persons to "declared countries" contained in the Consequential Provisions Act.51 The latter powers would not necessarily apply to persons on an interdicted ship because they would not yet meet the definition of an offshore entry person. Forcing ships back out to sea may result in refoulement, which is prohibited by the Refugee Convention and other human rights instruments.52 At the very least, the result might be "refugees in orbit"-that is, refugees traveling around, trying to secure entry to countries and being turned away.53
The Ultimately, the legality of the interdiction program depends on the risks of refoulement. No asylum seeker has been returned directly to a place of persecution. On the other hand, Australia has not put in place satisfactory safeguards against chain refoulement. Several vessels have now been escorted back to Indonesian waters,63 and the Australian government clearly wants boats to return to Indonesia in the future. Indonesia is not a party to the Refugee Convention. In actuality, Indonesia grants temporary refuge, a practice that may support the customary international legal status of non-refoulement.64 However, refuge is granted on the basis that Western countries of immigration such as Canada, the United States, and Australia will take responsibility for resettling the refugees.65 It is thus questionable whether refuge in Indonesia constitutes protection elsewhere.
Extending the Concept of "Protection Elsewhere"
"Protection elsewhere" is relied on under the new Australian arrangements in two ways. First, Australia seeks to deny access to its procedures for determining refugee status on the basis that asylum seekers had or could have had access to protection in a country they had transited. Second, asylum seekers are taken to countries participating in the Pacific Solution, which were not transited by the asylum seekers and which, under the legislation, must be declared by the minister to meet certain minimum safeguards. In both cases, the Australian legislation copies, extends, or varies the idea of "protection elsewhere" developed in Europe and the United States and accepted, to some degree, by the UNHCR Executive Committee.
The concept of "protection elsewhere" raises two issues. The first is whether asylum seekers may have the right to choose a country of asylum-a question upon which the Refugee Convention is largely silent. The second is whether refugees are "protected" in the place where they are sent. Protection encompasses prevention of refoulement, but it also extends to safeguarding basic human rights. This interpretation has been accepted in key resolutions of the UNHCR Executive Committee discussed below, by somejurists,66 and in some state practice.67
The two questions of protection and "choice" as to a particular country of asylum are often closely linked. Many asylum seekers are forced to move on because they do not receive adequate protection at their first port of call. Such asylum seekers often arrive in Australia On the one hand, the Refugee Convention does not contain a right to enter any particular country and its provisions are designed only for those who have nowhere else to go.70 Moreover, Article 31 of the Convention, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on refugees for unlawful arrival, speaks of their "coming directly" from places of persecution. Restrictions on the freedom of movement of such refugees may be imposed if necessary and "until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into another country."71 States parties are to "allow such refugees a reasonable period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country."72
On the other hand, the primary purpose of Article 31 is to prevent the imposition of penalties rather than to permit states to send refugees elsewhere.73 During the drafting, a proposal to amend Article 31 so that it would provide immunity from penalties only to refugees who could prove they were unable to find even temporary asylum in another country was dropped.74 As noted by Goodwin-Gill: effectively that the asylum seeker has "chosen" the country of refuge. Since it may be equally, if not more, unfair to both states and asylum seekers to let responsibility rest on the country an asylum seeker first entered,just as it is unfair for countries with a strong economy to be the ultimate destination of asylum seekers, it may well be that states should accept the idea that asylum seekers have some choice. The European Council on Refugees and Exiles has urged the European Union to move away from the premises of the Dublin Convention and to accept that responsibility for determining refugee status rests with either the state in which an asylum seeker's family is present or the state in which an asylum application is lodged.90
Notably, even the Kosovo evacuation program to third countries, including Australia-a situation of mass influx where a solidarity mechanism is required-was consensual,91 in contrast to Australia's removal of asylum seekers to countries participating in the Pacific Solution. The new EU directive on temporary protection also requires asylum seekers to consent before being transferred to another state.92 Australia's policy, however, is more like the U.S. policy of removing Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers involuntarily to "offshore safe haven camps."93
The number of asylum seekers arriving spontaneously in Australia is so small94 and the country so well placed to accept them because of its relative economic strength, its multicultural society, and the presence of many of the asylum seekers' families that talk about "burden sharing" on Australia's part is disingenuous. The government's rhetoric95 demonstrates the point made by Deborah Anker,Joan Fitzpatrick, and Andrew Shacknove96 that talk of burden sharing may be used by "sophisticated Northern governments" to abrogate their international obligations while neglecting to provide financial assistance to other states.97 The Pacific Solution involves the payment of money to Pacific islands only for the short-term object of processing asylum seekers, and it has preyed on and distorted an already unequal relationship between Australia and Pacific states.98
What constitutes "protection "?Regardless of whether asylum seekers have the right to choose a country of asylum, it is essential that any putative safe third country provide protection. The Australian legislation and practice is deficient on this score. This comes as no surprise in view of the government's apparent focus on deterrence and the allocation of blame for not having accessed protection in the past, rather than on whether protection is now achievable in a third country. In addition to observing the requirements of the committee's conclusions, the state of arrival should conclude an admission agreement with the putative safe country. In the absence of such an agreement, only the state of nationality has an obligation to admit a person to its territory. Decisions to send particular asylum seekers to a putative safe third country should also be communicated to that country to avoid misunderstandings about the reason for the asylum seekers' arrival.'04 Such misunderstandings can lead to refoulement.
Australia's practice of returning people to Indonesia does not meet these requirements. Protection from refoulementis uncertain. Once asylum seekers have left Indonesia, they probably do not have a legal right to reenter the country under Indonesian national law. Although it is strongly arguable that customary international law obliges Indonesia not to expel the asylum seekers, it is unsafe to rely on this obligation in the absence of an admission agreement, just as it would be unsafe to send an asylum seeker off to another country simply because it is party to the Refugee Convention. Australia relies on Indonesia's participation in an arrangement with Australia whereby Indonesia intercepts asylum seekers on the way to Australia;'05 however, the two countries appear not to have made an express agreement concerning the readmission of asylum seekers once they have left.
Whether temporary refuge in Indonesia qualifies as "protection" in a broader sense is also questionable. It is not the equivalent of refugee status with all its attendant rights, and one may doubt whether Indonesia can protect and ensure the fundamental human rights of asylum seekers, even given the assistance of the Australian government and the International Organisation for Migration. Australia relies on UNHCR's presence in Indonesia as a guarantee of protection.l06 However, the mandate of UNHCR is limited. It can recognize refugees and provide humanitarian assistance--despite severe budgetary constraints-but it does not have the territorial base of a state. Thus, although its Statute speaks of securing "international protection,"107 UNHCR must work with states to achieve this goal. 1, 8 (Dec. 14, 1950), excerpted in GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 56, at 384. 108 This limitation is particularly apparent from the language used in paragraph 8 of the Statute, id.
powers concerning countries' obligations of protection are limited to suasion,109 and the agency certainly cannot compel a country to accept refugees as permanent residents. For Australia to push its "refugee problem" back on developing countries and a cash-strapped international organization unconscionably inverts its responsibilities. Australia also relies on "declared countries" to provide protection during the determination of asylum seekers' status, which extends the notion of "safe third countries" adopted in Australia, Europe, and elsewhere"1? to countries that have simply agreed to determine refugee status as opposed to providing full refugee protection. The reliance on declared countries shares at least one problem with the more usual practice of listing particular countries as safe-namely, failure to consider the position of the individual asylum seeker and the possibility of refoulement that flows from this failure. The ministerial declaration contemplated in section 198A of the Migration Act refers to the general situation in the declared country, rather than the position of individual asylum seekers. Section 46A(2) of the Migration Act makes provision for ministerial discretion to lift the bar on valid visa applications in Australia if it would be in the public interest. However, the Act does not suggest any factors that the minister might take into account."l Presumably, it would serve the public interest for the minister to take into account considerations relating to individuals for the purposes of section 46A(2), given that Australia would be in violation of international law if these factors were not considered. However, ministerial discretion is not the same as mandatory consideration of these issues and may therefore not suffice to meet Australia's international obligations.
It is also unclear how "an opportunity to seek and enjoy asylum"'12 is offered by countries that merely act as processing centers. However, since Australia is supposed to remove all asylum seekers, including those determined to be refugees, from the "declared countries," it may be accepted that an opportunity to seek and enjoy asylum is granted indirectly. If no third country agrees to protect the refugees, it is suggested that Australia would be obliged to provide protection itself.'13 Certainly, detention of asylum seekers in declared countries does not conform to "accepted international standards.""14 In Nauru, for example, asylum seekers are held in conditions that amount to detention for the duration of their stay,115 which is a violation of human rights'16 and an example of refugee "warehousing"'17-treatment for which Australia 127 See text supra at notes 112-13.
The second question relates to the meaning of the term "penalty." Clearly, this word encompasses the imposition of criminal sanctions for unlawful entry. However, it may also prohibit all forms of discrimination between lawful and unlawful arrivals. As stated in a decision by the English Social Security Commissioner, any other construction "puts form above substance."'28
The third question is whether the imposition of a lower form of protection for "asylum-shoppers" is permissible. Article 31 speaks of refugees who come "directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened," suggesting that it may be permissible to discriminate according to the route taken to reach Australia. However, the Australian legislation does not permit even those "offshore entry persons" who have come directly from their country of origin to access the usual procedures for determining refugee status unless the minister lifts the bar on valid applications. Nor are refugees given the opportunity to explain why they were unable to seek protection in the countries they transited, unless the minister takes such an explanation into account in the exercise of his discretion to permit a visa application by an offshore entry person129-though Article 31 is clearly intended to allow unlawful entrants that opportunity.'30
Even if Article 31 of the Refugee Convention is strictly interpreted to refer only to criminal punishments, rather than discrimination, or to penalties for unlawful entry rather than The Pacific Solution is detrimental to refugee protection and likely to prove impractical in the longer term.'48 The Australian government has erected the main obstacles to change through its unwillingness to listen to international opinion'49 and its corresponding eagerness to manipulate Australian public opinion. Onshore asylum seekers are portrayed as "forumshoppers" who throw their children overboard,'50 and terrorists.151 By playing into Australians' long-standing fear of the Asian other,152 the government secured election for a third term. It now thinks it has a mandate for its policies.
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